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Introduction
The age old debate on how to divide the national income pie between capital owners and labour has in recent times been reignited by policy makers, politicians, trade unions and the popular press. This renewed interest in factor shares stems from the fact that over the last two decades, the labour share across a host of industrialised countries has followed a downward trend, as opposed to the periods in the 1960s and 1970s where the labour share of national income was considerably higher. Furthermore, citing the decline of the labour share has become somewhat of a popular rally cry for certain stakeholders seeking to promote the ills of globalisation and the need to increase the taxation of companies. Therefore, identifying those factors which help explain changes in factor shares is paramount in order to facilitate both informed debate and policy formulation.
While early studies assumed factor share constancy as one of the key regularities characterising economic growth (e.g., Kaldor (1963) ), subsequent contributions have shown that factor shares have not been stable in the mediumterm with several explanations being proposed Blanchard (1997) ; De Serres et al. (2001); Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) ; Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) ; Guscina (2007) ; Meyler (2001) . Overall, no definitive theory or specific cause is able to explain all changes in factor shares. What does appear to emerge, however, is that explanations can essentially be grouped into temporary and cyclical factors such as energy prices and adjustment costs, while others can be viewed as being more structural in nature 1 The structural factors affecting factor shares include, for example, changes in the sectoral composition of economies, technological progress, labour market policies, product market imperfections and increasing international economic integration. This paper attempts to measure in how far the European economic integration process has affected the labour share.
Within the EU, the Single Market programme, several waves of enlargement and the introduction of the euro have all contributed to increasing European economic integration over the last few decades. While previous studies examining the impact of globalisation on the labour share tend to focus on the increasing role of emerging economies such as China and India in world trade (e,g., Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) ; Guscina (2007) impact on the share of labour in national income.
The legacy of obstacles to trade in the EU and their subsequent dismantling has had considerable implications on European industrial structure (cfr. Lyons et al., 2001 ). While it is widely accepted that efficiency and welfare benefits emerge as a result of increased competition in product markets, European countries have been considerably slower in adopting anti-trust legislation when compared to the US (Mueller, 1996) . In the founding Treaty of the European Community, despite incorporating strict anti-trust rules, the emphasis was on cross-border implications and not within country competition. It was not until the Maastricht Treaty that antitrust legislation in certain countries converged closer to European standards. Moreover, firms are ever more adept at employing innovative strategies in order to ensure that any rents earned are protected from strict regulation (Konings et al., 2001) . Consequently, it would appear to be of interest to examine if market structure developments which occurred concurrently with the integration process in the EU have affected the labour share in Member States.
An additional channel through which the process of European economic integration might affect the labour share is through the increased mobility of firms. As firms become ever more footloose, Member States increasingly compete with each other as a means of attracting foreign direct investment.
Consequently, both workers and governments can become embroiled in a raceto-the bottom, where only the country with the lowest wages or tax rates will succeed in attracting firms and employment. This paper examines whether increasing international competition contributes to decreasing labour share.
In examining these factors, a framework, building on the work of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) (BS) is developed. These authors estimate the impact of changing technology, factor prices, adjustment costs and the bargaining power of unions on the labour share. In order to investigate how European economic integration affects the labour share, this study extends their model and estimates the impact of declining trade costs, foreign competition and changes in market structure. Although the empirical analysis of this paper focuses on European economic integration, the theoretical framework also applies to global economic integration. Since European economic integration was already under way when the globalisation trend started to strengthen, it may shed some light on possible future effects of closer integration at a global scale.
A significant contribution of this paper stems from enhancing the measurement of factors explaining the labour share. For example, previous studies examining the impact of globalisation on factor shares use aggregated measures of trade openness such as the ratio of trade to GDP (Guscina, 2007; Moral and Gernre, 2007) , while this study uses bilateral trade data at the industry level to construct a measure of trade openness which is derived directly from theory. In addition, the role of market structure is estimated by using mark-ups and concentration ratios derived from firm-level data, which have not been examined empirically in previous studies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of the labour share and the importance of compositional effects.
Some statistics on potential explanatory variables is given, such as the evolution of trade costs and industry concentration. Section 3 then introduces a small theoretical framework, making predictions on the direction of the influence of some of the suggested explanatory variables. Section 4 presents the estimation results and section 5 concludes.
Descriptive Analysis:
The evolution of the labour share and compositional effects
The evolution of the labour share
In this study, the labour share (LS) is defined as
where LC E , LC s and VA refer to labour compensation for employees, labour compensation for the self-employed and value added. A caveat in measuring these variables relates to allocating taxes on production to labour and capital. This is a complex undertaking, as there are many different types of taxes. In the EUKLEMS database 3 which is used throughout this paper all taxes on production are allocated to capital.
The top panel of figure 1 shows the evolution of the labour share for the EU as a whole. The picture clearly shows why the evolution of the labour share has drawn much attention recently: whereas the labour share was at a high level and even increasing in the 1970s this was followed by a significant decrease in the subsequent decades. In the later years the downward trend seems to have bottomed out. The bottom panels show the evolution separately for a which experienced a significant increase. In more recent years, the decline in the labour share appears to be slowing down, or has even started to increase again, for example in the UK.
Decomposition of changes in the labour share
A simple and highly relevant potential explanation for the observed change in the aggregate labour share might be the occurrence of changes in the composition of the economy, rather than a change in the labour share of the economy as a whole. Since the time span under consideration is rather long These authors write the aggregate labour share of a multi-sector economy as the sum of the value-added weighted labour share of each sector:
where the variables comp i,t and va i,t are the labour compensation and value added in sector i in year t, ω i is the share of sector i in the total economy value-added and LS i is the labour share of sector i. Differentiating over time, the change in the aggregate labour share can be split into two components; help explain a significant part of the decline in the labour share on the aggregate level. As can be seen from figure 6, the 'within effect' for the EU15 clearly outweighs the 'compositional effect', however, and therefore the changing composition can not serve as a complete explanation for the observed decline in the labour share.
However, changes in the relative importance of sectors may not be the only type of compositional change in the economy which affect the evolution of the labour share. If the firm size distribution was affected by the European integration process, for example, and larger firms have a different labour share, 5 we may expect to find significant inter-firm compositional effects. the economic downturn in that period, suggesting that cyclicality may be an important factor in explaining changes in factor shares.
The significant size and ambiguous direction of the within component, both at the firm and sector level suggests that a significant share of the observed variance of factor shares cannot be explained by compositional effects, and that there might be other fundamental factors driving factor shares. Moreover, the decomposition methodology remains silent on the causes of the differences in the initial (or simply long-run) levels of the labour share in the units under consideration. The remainder of this section will show a descriptive analysis of some popular explanations the declining labour share.
Inspecting the evolution of trade openness
Globalisation is often seen as one a possible cause of the declining share of labour in national income. A prediction of the classic Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade is that the reward to labour in relatively capital intensive countries (such as the countries under consideration) declines after opening up to trade. More recent models of union wage demands with footloose firms predict that when firms become more footloose, they might be able to limit union wage demands by threatening to relocate. Globalisation may also affect the average size of firms (or the entire firm size distribution), and the fashion or intensity of competition between firms. Larger footloose firms with more market power may be expected to pay out a smaller share of their value added to employees. To investigate the aggregate effect of globalisation through such channels the measure of trade openness as derived by Head and Ries (2001) is calculated from bilateral trade data at the industry level. Head and Ries (2001) argue that under reasonable assumptions following measure φ of the 'freeness of trade' which is inversely related to trade costs can be calculated using only trade and production data What transpires is that the degree of trade openness increased significantly over this period. Spain became much more integrated following its accession to the EU in 1986. Norway did not experience the large increase of trade openness with respect to the EU such as Spain and the other member states, strongly suggesting that the European integration process through various policies implemented by the EU was the main driver behind the intra-EU decline in trade costs. The fact the decline in the labour share occurred concurrently with this significant decline in trade costs makes it suggestive to draw conclusions about a causal relationship. The fact we observe both the labour share and the measure for trade openness over many years, for different countries, and for different industries will allow to investigate this hypothesis in a more formal framework in section 4, where we will also be able to control for other factors affecting the labour share.
Globalisation and market structure
For some, globalisation for many brings the image of large multinationals, who by their sheer market power are able to exploit the local workforce, or at least are able to limit the bargaining power of labour unions. In this section we briefly consider whether increasing economic integration indeed has been accompanied with increasing concentration and higher markups for firms. This descriptive analysis points to a specific kind of evolution in the firm size distribution, where only the very large firms grow even larger, and the rest of the distribution seems be become less skewed, somewhat more uniform. A possible cause could be that due to the European integration process only the very large firms are able to compete on the truly trans-European level, and this segment underwent a period of intensive consolidation to reap the benefits of production on a larger scale, whereas for the majority of firms, European integration brought mainly an intensification of competition, both competition from abroad and competition from smaller firms, which were able to increase their market share during the period under consideration.
Since the analysis of the evolution of market concentration shows a mixed picture, it is hard to predict this evolution translated in to shifts in the average market power of firms 10 . The last column of table 2.4 shows the evolution of the average mark-up in all countries and sectors as measured by the Lernerindex 11 . Clearly, the average markup seems to have declined over the years in our sample.
To investigate whether these trends in concentration and market power relate to the European integration process, a small regression analysis was done, the results of which are shown in Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 2 : Fixed effects regressions relating trade costs, market concentration and the markup fixed effects, these regressions confirm the intuition that (column 1) increasing freeness of trade φ has is associated with with a decrease in concentration;
(column 2) increasing concentration is associated with higher markups; and (column 3) increasing freeness of trade φ is associated with lower markups.
How and to what extent these factors can help explain the declining labour share will be the subject of sections 3 and 4 respectively.
Theoretical Framework -Factors driving factor shares
This section presents a theoretical framework which can be employed to understand how different factors can be expected to affect the share of labour in national income. We commence by introducing the basic framework developed by Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) . These authors show that with a constant returns to scale technology with capital and labour as sole factors of production, and allowing for labour augmenting technological change, a strictly monotonic relationship emerges between the labour share and the readily observable capital-output ratio. BS then discuss several deviations from this framework and how they can be expected to shift the relationship between the labour share and the capital output ratio. We will proceed in a similar fashion. The basic framework of BS in described in section 3.1. Section 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 discuss respectively how capital augmenting technological change, prices changes of intermediate goods and hiring and firing costs affect the relationship between the labour share and the capital output ratio. Section 3.2.1 examines possible channels through which declining trade costs and foreign competition could affect factor shares, while section 3.2.2 examines the effects of changes in market structure.
The basic framework of BS

The benchmark BS model
To explain changes in the labour and capital share, it is necessary to make some assumptions on the technology of firms. In light of this, our starting 
Writing k = K/Y = 1/ f (l) for the capital-output ratio shows that there exists a one-to-one relationship between l and the capital-output ratio k, as f is monotonic.
In the case of perfect output and labour markets, labour demand is defined by setting the marginal cost of labour equal to marginal revenue w c = pB f , where w c stands for the competitive wage, p is the market price and f' is the derivative of f with respect to its sole argument l. This implies the share of labour is simply
where the second equality follows from the fact that k = 1/ f (l), and thus defines a one-to-one relationship between the readily observable capital-output ratio k, l and the labour share. Various elements contained in this simple framework, such as capital accumulation, changes in factor prices of labour and capital, labour augmenting technological change do not affect this relationship between the capital-output ratio and the labour share. What follows in the remainder of this section is a discussion of several important deviations from the base model which could offer alternative explanations for the observed change in the labour and capital share
Capital augmenting technological change
An important stylised fact of economic growth over the last hundred years is the relative constancy of the rate of return to capital and the steady increase of wages over time. Acemoglu (2003) recently developed a theoretical model with a constant rate of return to capital, increasing wages and a constant labour share along the equilibrium long run growth path. In his model, firms can invest in labour and capital augmenting technological change. In the long run, firms optimally invest only in labour-augmenting innovations and the share of labour in national income is constant. After a shock, however, there might indeed be capital-augmenting technological change with the possibility of factor shares deviating from their long run equilibrium levels. These empirical and theoretical findings suggest that modelling technological change as purely labour augmenting is a reasonable approximation.
The model of Acemoglu (2003) suggests capital augmenting technological change might occur off the steady-state growth path, and this is accompanied by changes in the factor shares. The BS model is not dynamic, but allowing for capital augmenting technological change in the production function via
This clearly shows that capital augmenting technological change induces shifts of the entire LS − k relationship.
Intermediary input prices
Changes in the relative prices of additional factors of production, such as materials or energy and services equally shifts the entire LS-k schedule.
, where M stands for materials, for example, makes the labour share a function of the capital-output ratio, but also of the real price of the material input q/p. Assuming CES as specific functional form of the production technology BS show that the more labour and capital are substitutes (complements), the more a rise in the price of material inputs will decease (increase) the SL-k schedule and thus, assuming a constant capital-output ratio, a lower (higher) labour share.
Counter-cyclical labour share: adjustment costs
In addition, a key characteristic of labour markets in general and particularly in many EU Member States, is that they are rigid. If it is expensive for firms to hire and fire workers, this will affect how the labour share behaves throughout the business cycle. If firing a worker is expensive, then labour demand will remain above the frictionless level as the real marginal cost of labour is lowered by the firing cost. This implies that, all else being equal, the labour share will increase during economic downturns. The reverse also holds in presence of hiring costs and economic upturns 12 . This paper follows the approach of BS, controlling for adjustment costs by including the growth of employment in the labour share regression (with a negative coefficient expected).
Additions to the BS model
Economic integration and footloose firms.
Increasing foreign competition and the risk of firms relocating to other jurisdictions in the pursuit of cost savings, are often perceived as factors which limit the scope for union wage demands and as an important source of the downward pressure on wages and thereby, the share of labour in national income. In this section, a small theoretical framework is developed, where the optimal union wage demand is affected by economic integration and foreign competition 13 .
Assume an economy containing unionised firms in which bargaining takes place over both wages and employment (efficient bargaining). Unions aim to maximize the total wage bill w L and take employment at the competitive wage w c as an outside option during wage negotiations. Firms seek to maximize their profit pY − w L and take the net potential foreign profits Π as their outside option (threatening to relocate should negotiations fail). Although a full model describing foreign profits is not developed, Π can reasonably be assumed to be a function of relocation costs and foreign wages or some other measure of foreign production costs. Bargaining cooperatively, the union and the firm maximize the generalized Nash product for example due to moving costs being prohibitively high), then unions are able to appropriate all of the operation rents pY in the form of higher wages.
In this scenario, wages are equal to the operating revenue per worker, the maximum wage which can be paid without making losses. However, if firms can credibly threaten to relocate (Π > 0), bargaining takes place only over pY − Π. In the limiting case where foreign profits equal the operating profits of a non-unionised firm Π = pY − w c L, the threat of delocalisation is perfect and the union can not make any wage demands above the competitive wage, irrespective of its bargaining power.
Using the expression for the bargained wage in equation , the following expression for the labour share in case of efficient bargaining is obtained:
From equation (9) 
Market structure, economic integration and markups
If output markets are not perfectly competitive, optimal labour demand no Lerner index, the factor by which prices exceed the marginal cost of production.
The labour share then becomes
Or in the case of efficient bargaining (assuming unions ignore the effect their actions might have on the price setting behaviour of firms):
In the workhorse Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition markups are constant and solely depend on the parameter controlling the price elasticity of substitution between varieties. Despite the many advantages of the DixitStiglitz framework, the fact that markups are constant has long been recognised as a rather unrealistic property of this model. Since then, various models of international trade have been developed where markups are time variant and depend on, for example, trade openness (φ) (see Ottaviano et al., 2002) , or the extent of concentration (ρ) in an industry (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) .
Following from this, in this paper, the markup m is assumed to be a function of trade openness and concentration, with m φ < 0 and m ρ > 0. The reverse effects also hold for the labour share, which -at least as far as the effect through changes in the markup -is increasing in the openness of trade and decreasing in the level of concentration. It is worth noting that even in this simple model the predicted effect of trade on the labour share is ambiguous. Freer trade simultaneously increases the outside options of firms (leading to a lower labour share) while also decreasing their market power (increasing the labour share).
Empirical estimation
As outlined in section 3.1, the framework of BS suggests augmenting fol-
with several explanatory variables which cause deviations from the LS-k relationship. Our preferred estimation specification takes the following form
where for each year t and sector i log(LS i t ) represents the log of the labour share, log(K i t /Y i t ) is the log of capital-output ratio, log(T F P i t ) is the log of total factor productivity, log(p
represents employment growth, w
is the log of foreign wages, φ i t trade openness and m i t are proxies for the market power of firms such as industry level markups and concentration levels.
Results
When estimating equation 12 in levels the test by Wooldridge (2002) strongly rejected the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Estimation therefore was done after taking first differences. 14 Table 3 shows the result of estimating equation 12 on first differences, using OLS with country/industry fixed effects and year dummies, Table 3 indicating that there is weak evidence for the existence of adjustment costs with firms retaining more staff during economic downturns (leading to a higher labour share) as compared to the frictionless case.
Column two shows includes φ as an explanatory variable. The short theoretical considerations made in the last section suggests the sign on this variable can not be readily predicted. Whereas freer trade is expected to make firms more footloose and thus limit the bargaining strength of unions and thus leading to a lower labour share, freer trade is simultaneously predicted to increase the labour share if freer trade implies lower markups. Given the fact this variable is a widely accepted measure of trade costs and has been meticulously constructed using country-sector level data for a long time period, the fact the estimated coefficient is not statistically different from zero might come as a disappointment. It is important to note, however, that the coefficient is actually rather precisely estimated. Although it can not be confidently be stated that the effect of freer trade is positive or negative, it is known with a high degree of certainty that the coefficient is neither very small or very large.
The last column of table 3 controls for some of the channels through which we expected trade liberalisation to affect the labour share, while allowing for a direct effect of trade freeness, via channels not covered in the model. Foreign wages and the industry level lerner index as used as proxies for foreign lowwage competition and the market power of firms respectively. Higher foreign wages are predicted to increase union leverage 15 , and indeed the estimated effect is positive. An increase in firms' market power as measured by the Lerner index leads to a lower labour share, as predicted.
An important question is in how far these variables are able to explain the significant changes in the labour share. the observed decline of the labour share. The effect of these variables is dwarfed by the effect of prices of intermediates, for example. that the evolution of the price of intermediary goods such as energy is indeed the most likely cause of the observed decline in the labour share.
Column (1) shows the results of estimating the regression of BS, where a quadratic relationship between the capital-output ratio and the labour share is incorporated. What transpires is that TFP, which captures the effect of both labour augmenting technological progress (which is not predicted to affect the LS-k schedule) and non-labour technological progress (which is expected to shift the LS-k schedule downwards), is negative (as expected) and statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient on prices of intermediates is positive and statistically significant which is in line with the findings of BS. In a nonreported specification, positive and negative changes in employment were introduced as separate regressors to allow for asymmetric adjustment costs.
The estimated coefficients were 0.005(0.05) and -0.095(0.042), respectively, suggesting adjustment costs are indeed asymmetric, with firing being more expensive than hiring.
Conclusion
This paper, using a number of approaches, examined the evolution of the labour share in the EU while also exploring several explanations for these observed changes. The paper starts out by examining the importance of compositional effects in explaining changes in the labour share. What transpires is that the change in the relative weight of sectors with a relatively low labour share in an economy has tended to decrease the aggregate labour share in most countries. Furthermore, within sector changes have also been an important factor driving the labour share. The direction of its influence has been somewhat ambiguous. Using detailed firm level data for Belgium, changes in the relative weight of firms also appears to have a negative influence on the aggregate labour share, which echoes the industry level findings. The decomposition of yearly changes suggests cyclicality plays an important role in explaining changes in factor shares.
As a means of examining additional factors driving changes in the labour share, this paper builds on the framework of Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) by examining how economic integration via declining trade costs, foreign competition and changes in market structure, impact on the labour share. These theoretical predications are then empirically tested and what emerges from the data is in line with these predictions. An increase in foreign wages increases the labour share, which is in line with the theory that weaker foreign competition reduces the viability of relocation as an outside option for firms. Furthermore, industry concentration measures are constructed using firm level data and it emerges that industries with higher concentration levels are associated with lower labour shares as predicted by theory. Freer trade and sectors with higher markups are found not to have a statistically significant affect on the labour share. Apart from being non-significant, the confidence interval of the standardised coefficients of these variables, expressing how well these variables can explain the observed overall change in the labour share, indicates these variables are by no means the main cause of the observed decline in the labour share Overall, the findings suggest that the European integration process lowered the labour share by a small amount, if at all. In any case the effect of economic integration and changes in the market structure is quite limited when compared to the effects of technological change and prices of intermediary goods, such as energy prices. 
